Archives for posts with tag: Lagos

When the Dutch laid claim and established a settlement on “Manhattoes” in the 17th century, the strategic value of the wooded jut between two mighty waterways was already readily apparent. “We found a very agreeable site located within two small prominent hills in the midst of which flowed to the sea a very big river, which was deep within the mouth,” explorer Giovanni da Verrazano had written in 1524.[1]

The prospects for Lagos Island, a water-hemmed city at times branded Africa’s Manhattan, were hazier given its “natural difficulties caused by winds, tides, the rainy season, the rough bar, and [ships] being obliged to anchor for safety far out at sea”—a situation John Whitford observed in 1875 that did not prevent merchants from being nonetheless “alive to its importance” given the lack of protected ports on the West African coast.[2] Lagos Island had for centuries prior been a place of intercoastal but not globally significant trade, a sea-level sandbar severed from the Atlantic by a notoriously wrathful channel until its early nineteenth century rise as a Portuguese slavers’ haunt.

An 1859 map of Lagos Island and the notorious channel linking it to the Atlantic. (Image source)

Across the ocean, it was through a fort, taverns, farms, storehouses, townhomes, and churches that a growing cosmopolitan enclave at New Amsterdam clung to and eventually found its prosperous footings in the New World. In Lagos, it was through houses that an initial foothold and then a sturdier leg up out of the soggy landscape was probed as waves of new arrivals carved out a small island kingdom, a vibrant entrepôt, a colony, a capital, and eventually the urban colossus of over 20 million people we know today.

Across a kaleidoscopic diversity of forms and arrangements, houses have maintained their paramount importance in Lagos even as the city has developed a crippling housing shortfall.

The question of housing has now become New Yorkers’ top concern, and with the election of Zohran Mamdani as the city’s Mayor, there is an openness to policies untested by conventional American politics.[3] The concept of social housing has gained momentum in New York and is embraced by Mamdani. Many of its examples and principles come from celebrated European case studies like Vienna where over 60 percent of residents live in municipal housing. A new generation of New Yorkers with Mamdani—an African American from Uganda, the son of an eminent African political science professor, and an undergraduate Africana Studies major himself—as their voice may also be able to find inspiration and insights from the fastest urbanizing continent and its largest city, Lagos.

Looking at Lagos’s historical homes—learning from Lagos on its own terms as the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas once proposed (but fell short of)[4]—offers ideas and an image in the form of its ilé house typology, I suggest, for seeing past the straitjacket of contemporary housing discourse.

These increasingly urgent conversations about our global housing shortage have often become so narrowed and mired in a myopic way of seeing—as seen in the first New York mayor’s debate[5]—that they completely miss the expansiveness of possibilities and pathways inherent in human inhabitation of a place, of what houses are and can be.

In other words, Lagos holds depths for thinking broader and more boldly about one of the world’s greatest challenges today.[6] The city’s histories and architectures may offer clues and references for the Mamdani generation in imagining social housing policies that break fresh ground.

A City of Upheaval Reinventing Itself Through Ilé

What we can piece together about the early history of Lagos houses comes from oral traditions and travelers’ accounts that describe great earthen compounds containing courtyards that were the hubs of communal life on the island. To be someone—to have rights, privileges, and protections—in the small precolonial Lagos kingdom of Èkó was to belong to a compound and be affiliated with its founding family: ilé in Yoruba refers both a house and a kinship network. Yorubaland was famed for its planned urbanism prototyped on its holy city Ilé-Ifẹ̀ (house of expansion), and houses were its defining infrastructure, their bustling inner yards serving as the spaces where politics, production of wares, and social life were centered.

Homes were also works of artistry, crafted over generations with carved pillars and other embellishments that demarcated the prestige and stories of their ilé. The German explorer Leo Frobenius was so impressed by architecture in Yorubaland, writing, “[the] originality of the building … struck me dumb,” that he felt the need to attribute it to a lost Etruscan race via its homes’ impluvium (water collecting) features.[7] 

1910 Leo Frobenius photographs of the courtyard of a traditional Yoruba ilé and carved pillars from Yoruba architecture. (Image source 1 and 2)

Similar hubris reigned in the 1851 British naval decision to bomb and occupy the island under the claim of ending its slave trade.[8] While British rule was initially precariously carried out by just a handful of colonial agents, the city’s position as a place of exchange of palm oil and other goods between the African interior and Atlantic blossomed. In this “fluorescence period” of cultural mixing and experimentation, African and creole merchants were the city’s scions, building distinctively Lagos-style houses that drew on Brazilian, Middle Eastern, and Victorian influence to transform Yoruba ilé for a new era.

Interiors of these houses incorporated ilé’s familiar spatial scaffolding with rooms splaying off a central passageway and integrated workshops and stores within the home. Smaller houses throughout the city adopted similar floorplans and became diminutive versions of the famous mansions mushrooming above the low-lying cityscape. These homes celebrated their status with flare, their owners annually replastering the exteriors with flower motifs and other fashionable patterns swirling in from the Atlantic in a practice that evoked the Yoruba àṣọ ẹbí culture of dressing one’s kin in matching fabric.

Modest Lagos Style rowhomes (1908), and the famed pillars of Ebun House (1920), a celebrated example of the Lagos Style. (Image sources: National Archives UK and source)

These new forms of ilé became how a Black cosmopolitan class of Yoruba and returned former slaves reclaimed the city as their own, sinking roots into the sandbar and signaling their long-term investment (and thus their creditworthiness within new practices of mortgaging) amidst the ebbs and flows of the city’s waterways and the mercurial tides of commerce they carried.

A remarkable 1885 map surveyed by a West African named W.T.G. Lawson includes the names of 125 prominent Lagosians, indicating where they resided on the island. Prominent members like Táíwò Ọlówó—who had risen from an enslaved child to a great merchant with a sprawling multi-courtyard compound in the Faji District[9]—were held to high standards by the community in their roles as landlords and patrons, being expected to use their wealth and status generously and conspicuously to look out for their people. As Táíwò’s 1901 obituary celebrated, “with him money became wealth in the fullest sense of the term,” as he lived up to the expectation to infuse his gains back into the neighborhood and networks that made them possible.

1885 map of Lagos Island by W. T. C. Lawson plotting the Lagos Style houses of 125 of the city’s most prominent residents. (Source)

Yet with the turn of the century, this class of homeowners would be kneecapped at every turn by the colonial administration as it refined its ability to wield land and housing as instruments of power. Colonial agents targeted and undercut Black Lagosians who aspired to follow in men like Táíwò’s footsteps by passing impossible housing regulations requiring the use of materials not readily available in the colony and restricting credit along racial lines, driving their mortgages underwater and confiscating their property as a means of expanding and consolidating British rule.

Under imperialism, Lagos planners conceived of houses in blunt terms of power and physical occupation, erecting brick and iron structures to assert colonial officers’ position above African subjects. The hulking waterfront Government House (1896) epitomized this desire to dominate with architecture. To build these estates, British governors seized premier city lots, eventually creating segregated enclaves under the pretext of health policy. Colonial reports portrayed Lagosians’ homes as incubators of disease, writing that Africans’ “mud huts and timber houses … cannot be called houses.”[10] Yet, the archive shows that the Foreign Office’s own studies revealed more mosquitoes lurking in colonial quarters than African.[11] Like so much of colonial planning in Lagos, an aesthetic project was prioritized over actual empirical or historical inquiry.

Government House on Lagos Island (1896) and British officer bungalows in the segregated enclave of Ikoyi (1923). (Image sources: National Archives UK)

It was on the steps of Government House that the father of Nigerian nationalism, Herbert Macaulay, made his famous 1912 case against British land grabs in Lagos, bemoaning that these schemes were not for the health and development of natives, but part of a system predicated on getting “at the Tin Mines far away yonder” in Nigeria’s interior.[12]

Visions of what a proper colonial city should look like—surveillable with straight streets and uniform structures to facilitate the imperial port’s purpose of efficient extraction—drove housing decisions. Ilé, with their interlocking courtyards, organic materials, and odd angled annexes housing all assortments and comings-and-goings of kin were viewed as impediments to progress.

Bewildered by these arrangements, successive Lagos governors extended housing’s role beyond political and sanitary agendas, turning it into a means of directing and disciplining the city’s labor force. Barracks and small rentals became shelters for the city’s growing working class as Lagos became the capital of amalgamated colonial Nigeria (1916). Those deemed unemployable by the government were left homeless or in precarious dependency on hosts in the African side of the city, creating a new African landlord class who could leverage housing precarity to extract greater demands on their dependents and tenants. Shelter was no longer something taken for granted in Lagos; it had become a tool for organizing and directing resident’s toil toward colonial capitalism’s ends, leading to novel forms of poverty—and their policing by the state—previously not widely known in the city. Slums were emerging and, rather than assisting them, colonial agents fined and harassed their residents.

An 1891 cadastral map of Lagos showing the honeycombed density of African housing. (Image source: National Archives UK)

In this environment, houses became symbols of anti-colonial struggle with the African Mail writing of Lagos in 1908, “The natives begin to see that it is [Europeans] who are finding money to build all these fine palaces; … the people look at their own poor little huts alongside the palatial buildings of the European and wonder how long and how far this thing is to go.”

Yet the housing situation deteriorated further in the increasingly congested African sections of the city, as 86 percent of Lagos’s land had been expropriated by the Crown by 1947. This compression of 97 percent of the population into just 14 percent of the city’s area gave British planners new opportunities to recast the deprivation of African housing as justification for its seizure and demolition. In the name of the emerging concept of “development,” postwar officials transformed a century of colonial neglect and coercion on the African side of the city into the rationale for large-scale clearance.

This self-serving gambit reached its crescendo with plans in the 1950s to raze central Lagos without any actual analysis of the history, economics, or dynamic nature of the neighborhood. Thousands of market women marched against the scheme that would destroy the livelihoods and community sustained by the area’s mosaic of ilé. The sociologist Peter Marris’s 1950s surveys of central Lagos provide a counter-history to colonial claims of blight and backwardness, detailing a thriving hub where ilé principles of trust and mutual support had been reimagined to sustain extended social and commercial networks.[13] As a result of these relationships, Marris found that rents were paradoxically lower in the center of the city than elsewhere, as landlords and tenants who had known each other for years calibrated a rate that worked for both parties.

Demolition of central Lagos went forward nonetheless, making way for tall office buildings that constructed an image of a downtown befitting the capital of Britain’s West African crown jewel. Again, Lagos papers called out the game—that on the eve of independence the city was being turned “into a citadel for foreigners whilst the natives will be made to live in the mainland.”[14] Marris went on to document how central Lagos’s former residents suffered declines in their health, social lives, and financial positions in the supposedly superior modern estate where they were relocated on the mainland.

British planners’ presentation of the “disorder” and “village-mentality” of the to-be demolished Central Lagos (left) contrasted to the “order” and modernity of the estate for relocated residents (right), 1957. (Image sources: Lagos Executive Board Annual Report and Accounts (1957–1958))

Housing in Lagos grew upward in the form of cement low-rises as the city boomed from one million people in 1965 to five million in 1985. These mass apartments maintained the spatial logics of ilé through the arrangement of rooms along long central hallways. For those who could find a place in these tight-knit and aptly named “face-me-I-face-you” tenements, houses were a lifeboat amidst dizzying change in the postcolonial city. Housing blocks became mutual support communities while a succession of military dictatorships largely neglected the booming city’s municipal functions. Becoming part of these webs of landlord-tenant networks and their intricately defined social obligations became what a 1972 Lagos newspaper described as “a protective jacket” for the city’s residents.[15] These relationships and the city’s exponential population growth further amplified the value of homes, which was a grounded asset amidst the heady and speculative oil boom years after petroleum was discovered in Nigeria.

Leo Frobenius’s floorplan of a traditional Yoruba ilé and similar spatial logic in a 1970s “face-me” tenement floorplan. (Image source 1 and 2)

In the 21st century, Lagos houses have increasingly become financial instruments used to park and clean cash in what has been described as Nigeria’s “vampire” economy of an elite jet-setting class funneling off petroleum rents for private enrichment. Today, despite court injunctions, entire neighborhoods with generations of history and the few remaining Lagos-style houses (like the appallingly lost 200-year-old Ilojo Bar)[16] are being demolished and their residents displaced to make way for fortress-like mansions in gated enclaves disconnected from social and civic life. These forced evictions and a dire shortage of affordable housing are pushing residents and an endless sprawl of newcomers further into the rising waters on the frontlines of climate change.

Today, Lagos has a housing deficiency well over 5 million units, making cities like New York’s housing crisis appear manageable by comparison.[17]

A Lifeless Policy Playbook

The conventional prescription for Lagos and other cities with spiraling housing shortages is simply “to build more housing,” to find ways to unleash markets forces to generate new supply and—as the logic goes—to deflate housing costs. But Lagos is pure market, a hyper-capitalist frontier where new units should be popping up to satisfy immense demand. Yet this is not happening. Yes, land titling can be difficult in the legally layered city, but it is not impossible, and ọmọ onílẹ̀ (descendants of original landholders) with secure rights should have little problem building more housing and collecting further rents.

The problem is that the market is working: why would these landowners build mass housing and collect the drips of small leases when they can build manors for the city’s elite that command exponentially higher sums in one fell swoop? Lagos has become a legendarily stratified city with wealth disparities as pronounced as anywhere in the world. In 2016 it was calculated that luxury properties in Lagos ranged from 80 million to 1.3 billion Naira, whereas the average Lagosian earned far less than 120,000 naira per year.[18] The profit margins explain why the city’s developers focus almost exclusively on high-end properties. As Adéwálé Májà-Pearce has written, in contemporary Lagos, there is an overriding “interest in using what land can be had to house the elite.”[19]

One of many empty plots in an upscale Lagos neighborhood. (Author’s photograph)

Economists are starting to appreciate the ways in which this cliff between the richest and the rest skews markets in perverse ways. Disney World offers a case study in how the economic incentives are clear: targeting the ultrarich and leaving everyone else behind is just profitable business today.[20] Professional sports are seeing a similar shift towards targeting customers able to pay for premium experiences.[21] Washington, DC provides another datapoint against the “unleash supply” mantra of abundance[22]: the city granted private developers billions in subsidies since 2002 which created new units, yet “rents during this same timeframe increased roughly 55 percent” as developers built high end apartments almost exclusively, often gutting or demolishing affordable homes in the process.[23]

When housing becomes a luxury commodity out of reach to most, a city’s social fabric begins to breakdown. Houses—in all their myriads of forms—have historically been vessels for sustaining kinship bonds and allowing those ties to be nurtured, reproduced, and passed down. When that hearth is out of reach, a crisis of social reproduction occurs. As Nomusa Makhubu describes, Lagos’s film industry, Nollywood, is resplendent with films telling this tale of sterile mansions stocked with luxury items but no familial life. Frequently the movie plots revolve around uncovering a secret occult shrine that has possessed the house and its would-be patriarch.[24] What would it mean to exorcise limiting concepts of housing in Lagos writ large?

In place of houses becoming objects of capitalist possession unattached from the sociological cloth of cities, how do we reimagine houses and housing not only in Lagos but globally? Lagos’s historical ilé forms and their stubbornly resilient remnants offer a starting point to explore the wide spectrum of social and material architectures that can form housing and the possibilities to which secure housing gives life.

Learning from Lagos’s Legacy of Ilé

In Lagos, it is common to come upon houses with the hand-painted sign: “this house is not for sale.” This arises because con artists frequently sell other people’s homes to unsuspecting buyers. The notion of a home being sold off through a con echoes the discourse surrounding the flight of the country’s oil resources, from which the majority of the citizens do not benefit. The “crisis” of the home is symbolic of the “crisis” of the nation. As a visual metaphor, the home or the house is correlated to deception, illusion, or the ruse through which the experience of place is inseparable from image and imagination.

—Nomusa Makhubu, “This House Is Not for Sale”

In all their iterations and adaptations, ilé’s shared courtyards and communal spaces have meant stability and continuity, while also serving as sites of creativity and hospitality where reciprocal obligations of caretaking and custodianship have trumped possessive extraction. In other words, ilé are social housing and are what made Lagos possible as a city. Even across a century of colonial and postcolonial upheaval, housing animated by these underlying concepts have helped Lagosians remain in place and resist the imperial and financial forces that would dislodge them. Ilé remain a powerful architectural fabric in the city despite immense and intensifying pressure to displace Lagosians and reduce their homes to luxury commodities.

Can ilé-derived house types be preserved and creatively expanded to make up more of Lagos’s housing? In a city where 80 percent of high-end house buyers do not reside in the city, creating laws and incentives that reward the ilé model and enact costs on anti-social housing developments would be a place to start. For this to happen, the city needs designers, planners, and policymakers who are willing to look beyond broken supply-side economics and—with historical homes as muse—look at the fullness of possibilities of what housing could become.

Here would be the place to neatly drop in the most cited Lagosian architectural project of the past several years—the royal blue Makoko floating school—as an uplifting prototype for a path forward. Yet, as Allyn Gaestel chronicles in her article, “Things Fall Apart,” the now iconic A-frame won international accolades while it sat falling into disrepair, rarely holding classes because toilets and blackboards were not included in the design and parents wisely feared the structure’s violent swaying. [25]A week after it won the Venice Biennale’s Silver Lion Award, it splintered to pieces in a storm. Climate change and a century of a neighborhood’s marginalization cannot be conquered by a slick design, no matter how brilliant.

The iconic blue roof of Makoko floating school. (Author’s photograph)

If there is a Lagos “architecture” to look in search of the spirit of ilé, Justice and Power Initiatives (JEI), an organization that endlessly advocates and builds coalitions for the city’s slum dwellers is a better place to start. These residents are constantly under threat of violent state-sponsored evictions yet have built an organization in JEI to sustain a movement and demand attention and dignity.[26] Unfortunately, JEI’s work is not nearly as memetic as Makoko floating school.

Back in Manhattan and the surrounding boroughs, a growing coalition of housing advocates, architects, and legislators is advancing a renewed vision for social housing—one that treats homes as public goods rather than speculative assets. Proposals such as the creation of a Social Housing Development Authority would empower the city or state to build, acquire, and rehabilitate permanently affordable housing under democratic governance, ensuring residents—not private investors—shape how their communities evolve. This emerging framework, echoed in campaigns like Housing Justice for All and Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s call to recognize housing as a human right, seeks to replace extractive development with models that are inclusive, sustainable, and oriented toward long-term social value. Because housing is not just advocacy and socio-economic policy, but architecture, these campaigns will need compelling images and cultural references to succeed—particularly in the extreme visuality that our politics—as seen in the nearly cinematic campaign of Mamdani—now inhabits.

Zohran Mamdani’s winning campaign put affordability and housing at its core, explicitly endorsing the creation of a Social Housing Development Authority to finance public and cooperative housing through state capital. Now that Mamdani has been sworn in, there is hope that he can lead a movement to think bigger in embracing novel housing models. Lagos and its legacy of ilé offer inspiration where housing is inseparable from community, craftsmanship, and mutual care. Drawing on this model and its historical images, it is possible to imagine housing not merely as shelter but as social infrastructure for cities like New York—an opening to rebuild trust and belonging for the next generation.


Notes

[1] “Man in the News: He Came Here in 1524: Giovanni da Verrazano,” New York Times, November 21, 1964.

[2] John Whitford, Trading Life in Western and Central Africa (Liverpool: The “Porcupine” Office, 1877), 86.

[3] Community Service Society of New York, “Affordable Housing and Access to Healthcare Are Top Concerns of NYC Residents,” press release, December 14, 2023, Community Service Society News, https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/affordable-housing-and-access-to-healthcare-are-top-concerns-of-nyc-residen.

[4] Mark Duerksen, “The Koolhass Effect: Hot Air over Lagos,” Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism (JWTC), https://jwtc.org.za/test/mark_duerksen.htm.

[5] Housing New York: The Debate Had a Lot of Housing Talk, but the Next Mayor Needs Bigger Ideas,” New York Times, October 23, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/23/opinion/housing-new-york-mayor-cuomo-mamdani.html.

[6] Mark Duerksen, “Lagoon: Hidden Depths to Housing Schemes across Independence in Lagos, Nigeria,” Journal of West African History 7, no. 2 (2021): 49–90, https://scholarlypublishingcollective.org/msup/jwah/article-abstract/7/2/49/294077/LagoonHidden-Depths-to-Housing-Schemes-across

[7] Leo Frobenius, The Voice of Africa, vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, 1913), https://library.si.edu/digital-library/book/voiceofafricabei01frob

[8] The Crown did not officially outlaw domestic slavery in the Southern Nigerian Protectorate until 1916.

[9] While Táíwò held slaves himself, he was representative of the ways that land grants and the establishment of a house became an avenue for late nineteenth century enslaved people in Lagos to liberate themselves from systems of bondage that the British were reluctant to abolish out of fear of dislocating production.

[10] As quoted in Stephanie Newell, Histories of Dirt: Media and Urban Life in Colonial and Postcolonial Lagos (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020).

[11] “Reports, &c., From Drs. Stephens and Christophers, West Coast of Africa,” in Reports to the Malaria Committee of the Royal Society, 3rd ser. (London: Harrison and Sons, St. Martin’s Lane, 1900).

[12] Herbert Macaulay, The Lagos Land Question (Lagos: Tika-Tore, 1912).

[13] Peter Marris, Family and Social Change in an Africa City: A Study of Rehousing in Lagos (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1962).

[14] “Lagos Slum Scheme: For Whose Benefit?” Daily Service, November 21, 1955.

[15] Quoted in Sandra Barnes, Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 78.

[16] Stephanie Ohumu, “How to Kill a Monument: The Demolition of Ilojo Bar,” This Is Africa, September 21, 2016, https://thisisafrica.me/arts-and-culture/kill-monument-demolition-ilojo-bar/

[17] Lookman Oshodi, “Housing Situation in Lagos, Nigeria,” Lookman Oshodi: International Development, Urban Infrastructure and Governance (blog), November 24, 2010, https://oshlookman.wordpress.com/2010/11/24/housing-situation-in-lagos-nigeria/

[18] Estate Intel, The State of the Lagos Housing Market Vol. 2 (2016), https://estateintel.com/reports/the-state-of-the-lagos-housing

[19] Adéwálé Májà-Pearce, “Nothing without Water,” Places Journal, October 2023, https://placesjournal.org/article/lagos-nigeria-and-climate-crisis/

[20] Daniel Currell, “Disney Is the Happiest Place on Earth, if You Can Afford It,” New York Times, August 28, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/28/opinion/disney-world-economy-middle-class-rich.html

[21] Kevin Draper, “How the NBA and MLB Lost Their Fans,” New York Times, June 16, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/16/opinion/sports-nba-mlb-leagues-streaming-fan.html

[22] Steffen Wetzstein, “Toward Affordable Cities? Critically Exploring the Market-Based Housing Supply Policy Proposition,” Housing Policy Debate 32, no. 3 (2022): 506–532, https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2021.1871932

[23] The Center for Social Housing and Public Investment, “Part 2: The Economics of Speculation, Demolition and Displacement—A Worsening of Washington DC’s Affordable Housing Crisis,” Reports, Social Housing Center, https://www.socialhousingcenter.org/reports-2

[24] Nomusa Makhubu, “‘This House Is Not for Sale’: Nollywood’s Spatial Politics and Concepts of ‘Home’ in Zina Saro-Wiwa’s Art,” African Arts 49 (2016): 58–69.

[25] Allyn Gaestel, “Things Fall Apart,” Atavist Magazine, no. 76 (2018), https://magazine.atavist.com/things-fall-apart-makoko-floating-school

[26] “Nigerians Try to Make Sense of What Was Lost in the Makoko Fishing Village Demolition,” New York Times, January 16, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/16/world/africa/nigeria-makoko-fishing-village-destroyed.html

What might be Lagos’s most internationally recognizable building project since the 1980s isn’t a skyscraper or a suspension bridge — it’s a one-room schoolhouse. The now well-known A-frame bobs in the murky surf of Makoko, one of Lagos’s largest slums, providing a learning space for a community of 100,000+ people not officially recognized by the city government. Designed by Nigeria’s rising star Kunlé Adeyemi, the project made waves in the architectural world last year for its simplicity, adaptability, and humanity. I first read (and blogged) about the project last fall and was struck by the auroral beauty of the blue-roofed building set against the cooking smoke and plain timber structures of Makoko where new homes are often constructed on a soggy foundation of raw sewage (see episode 2 of the BBC’s documentary Welcome to Lagos). Here was a project that had actually succeeded in that often sought but rarely realized gauntlet of creating low-cost, high-design buildings from recycled material to benefit poor communities. Write-ups poured in from the New York Times, The Guardian, and many others, and Makoko Floating School splashed across my newsfeed for several weeks.

Last summer when I was in Lagos for the first time, I saw the school from the Third Mainland Bridge moments before glimpsing the city’s skyline and I have to admit that the school stole the spotlight. The Third Mainland Bridge is the longest bridge in Africa, meandering from Ebute Meta to Lagos Island, and, about halfway along, it provides the perfect balcony to view Akeyemi’s school (where I took the photo below). Akeyemi certainly knew how to make the most of a small-scale project that other architects might have scoffed at. For making a name for himself Akeyemi had good training — he worked at Koolhaas’s firm OMA for nearly a decade before founding his own firm NLÉ in 2010. His relationship with Koolhaas adds a fascinating dimension to Adeyemi’s project since Koolhaas’s Harvard Project on the City produced some of the most provocative writing on Lagos to date. Koolhaas challenged outside observers to see Lagos as being at the “forefront of globalizing modernity” — a dynamic urban space that had outgrown Western notions of the city and carrying capacity to become a “self-organizing” entity that completely disorientated visitors but somehow “worked.” Within this paradigm, it’s not surprising that Adeyemi saw that the future was in Lagos and returned to set-up shop. But of course his move and the civically-concerned design he’s been involved in since being back puts a twist on Koolhaas’s “self-organizing” thesis.

Away from the stratosphere of starchitects, the school itself has become the pride of Makoko, a place for a handful of youths to get an education long denied to the unincorporated fishing community. Every day local children park their hollowed out wooden canoes around the floating school and gather on its open-air decks for class, and in the evenings the buoyant building becomes a community center for local leaders. The project is only the prototype of a much larger masterplan that Adeyemi envisions for Makoko, and if funding comes through all of the neighborhood’s stilt-supported shacks will one day be replaced by floating A-frames. When that happens, it may just be a sight to rival Eko Atlantic — the megaproject of office buildings developing on the other side of the city and architectural spectrum.

IMG_3012

(Mark Duerksen 2014)

*Self-promotion warning* A book review and an article–both related to Lagos–that I wrote last year were recently published online. The African Studies Quarterly book review was on Kaye Whiteman’s Lagos: A Cultural History (highly recommended introduction to the city) and the article looked at Rem Koolhaas’s Lagos project and the highly critical responses to it, making the straightforward claim that critics’ borderline-vitriol was unnecessary and unproductive, and that despite numerous imperfections, Koolhaas’s project in fact pushes African urban research in productive new directions of grappling with African cities on their own terms rather than as stunted or failed versions of Western cities. The article was published in the Johannesburg Salon.

Review of Lagos: A Cultural History

The Koolhaas Effect: Hot Air over Lagos

 IMG_2988

Lagos Billboard (Mark Duerksen 2014)

Creating a mashup of aerial images of African cities is something I’ve wanted to do for a while now and today I finally had a minute to put the satellite images together. Here’s the link: Afrian_metropolises. I downloaded all of the images from Google Earth Pro at the same size and scale (from 34.7 miles). The top row shows six of West Africa’s largest cities, the middle row shows East and Central African cities, and the bottom shows southern Africa plus New York and Boston for familiar comparisons (for me at least). A few striking first glance observations include the size of the South African giants Johannesburg and Cape Town, and Nigeria’s neighboring megalopolises Lagos and Ibadan (especially these two Nigerian cities in comparison to Kano, which recent (politically motivated) censuses have given population figures equal to Lagos. This is not to say geographic size of a city is determinant of its population, but the aerial difference between these three cities is readily apparent). Also interesting to note is how obvious (but obviously not a scientific method) it is to tell how paved a city is or is not based on where the city lies on the scale between brown (dirt) and grey (asphalt). There’s a limit to how useful images/maps like this actually are, but it’s fun to look at and helpful to have a for developing a mental imprint of the relative geographic sizes and shapes of African cities. 

African_cities

(Mark Duerksen 2014)

This is the final post in an eight part series on the history of Ebola. For immediate information about how to help prevent the further spread of Ebola and keep yourself safe please consult and share the Ebola Facts website.

As we are well aware, this year the two-decade trend of isolated outbreaks in Central Africa every few years has been broken by a much larger and more prolonged series of cases in West Africa. The outbreak began when a two-year-old child in southeastern Guinea contracted the most deadly species of the virus (Zaire ebolavirus) in early December last year, putting into motion the initially slow and then progressively faster spread of the virus to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and now Nigeria. Unlike the past twenty year’s string of Central African outbreaks that were each unique and separate despite initial speculation otherwise, this year’s West African outbreak does seem to be the result of a single index case followed by human-to-human transmission. Here’s a good time-lapse map of that transmission through West Africa. Summaries of the specifics of this year’s outbreak are widely available online, so I won’t go into too much detail here, but I will offer a few pieces of analysis based on the history I’ve covered in the previous posts.

IMG_5260Matt Ridley gets it all wrong for The Times

First there’s a need to correct a couple of pieces of misinformation that continue to circulate with this year’s outbreak. A more minor error is that this is not in fact the first time that there has been a West African case of Ebola as many news outlets have reported. Previously a zoologist working in Cote d’Ivoire caught the Tai Forest species of the virus and then fully recovered in Switzerland. Second and more importantly, the virus has not been previously restrained to only rural, remote areas of Central Africa. As we’ve seen, two of the deadliest previous outbreaks occurred when the virus struck the relatively large cities and regional hubs of Kikwit and Gulu. These Central African cities might not have quite the same level of road infrastructure linking them to other urban centers as West African cities do (although I know plenty of people board buses every day in Gulu bound for several cities and countries), but these two cases do provide a precedent for urban outbreaks of Ebola. And although these previous urban outbreaks were incredibly deadly, the cities were able to eventually contain the virus’s spread within a matter of months. So, in searching for a reason why this year’s outbreak has spread so far and killed so many, the answer is not as simple as stating that this is the first time the virus has appeared in an urbanized setting.

Other explanations have included the slow recognition and response time of international medical teams. Again, a look at the history of the virus shows that response time is not a unique factor in considering why this outbreak is so much worse. In the cases of the 1976 Sudan and Zaire outbreaks and several subsequent episodes, international teams were slow to recognize the virus’s appearance and did not arrive on the scene until after the local communities had already contained the spread of the virus. This fact suggests that one reason for the extent and deadliness of this year’s outbreak might be partly found in the local community’s responses. As Hewlett observed in Gulu, the DRC, and Gabon, many communities in Central Africa possess long practiced social procedures such as quarantine and modified burial practices that they employ when their communities recognize that they are dealing with an especially virulent affliction. I do not know if communities in West Africa have similar procedures, but it would not be surprising if they don’t due to the fact that they’re not used to seeing diseases like Ebola, or alternatively that they did previously possess similar response techniques but that the long civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone destroyed that local knowledge as violence and insecurity ripped communities apart.

Whatever the cause(s) behind the severity of this year’s outbreak, the fact is Zaire ebolavirus’s path through West Africa has been more deadly than all previous Ebola cases combined, and I have to admit that when I initially heard that the virus had arrived in Lagos—the impetus for this series of posts—I feared that Ebola might finally find in the fast life, international networks, and rancid infrastructure of Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest city what HIV/AIDS found in the reused medical needles, sex trade, and migrant networks of 1970s Kinshasa and Brazzaville—that is, the lethal mixture of social and environmental conditions that would allow the virus to eventually explode into a global epidemic.

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Trash disposal in Lagos (Mark Duerksen 2014)

Being a Central African originating RNA virus linked to primates and transmitted through body fluids, comparisons of Ebola to HIV/AIDS were bound to occur. However there are several important differences that will likely yet prevent Ebola from boiling into an epidemic the way HIV/AIDS did. The first significant difference is the length of time from infection to fatality (or recovery for 10-60% of Ebola patients). HIV can hole up and multiply inside an infected person’s immune system for months, years, or even a decade, slowly destroying T-cells until it has killed so many that doctors consider the person to have developed AIDS. Over these months or years while HIV festers into AIDS, a person with HIV may be completely asymptomatic, but all the while still able spread the virus through sexual contact or blood transfusions. This slow and silent development timeline means that an HIV carrier might not even realize that he or she has become infected for years or even a decade and all the while be transmitting the virus to numerous people, allowing HIV to creep into a critical mass of carriers before it is even detected. This quiet buildup of an infected mass of people is exactly what happened for decades in Central Africa, and by the time doctors “discovered” HIV/AIDS, it was already an epidemic throughout the region.

Ebola on the other hand asymptomatically incubates for a few days or up to a few weeks, during which time the victim cannot transmit the virus to another person. Once symptoms develop after the incubation period, the patient’s health declines quickly and death is then generally a matter of days away, leaving only a very small window to further spread the virus (although it can still be contracted from infected corpses, so that is an additional concern and why burial practices are crucial to containing Ebola). One important note here is that those who recover from Ebola can still transmit the virus through semen or possibly breast milk for a number of weeks. While Ebola is easier to transmit during its small contagious window than HIV/AIDS is during its prolonged window, Ebola still has a low transmission rate,[1] requiring direct contact with infected bodily fluids, and the virus cannot be transmitted through the air the way respiratory diseases can be. Despite the horrific extent and fatality numbers of Ebola in West Africa, the virus will likely burn itself out due to its short contagious window (although it might take severe quarantine and curfew measures as we’re now seeing in West Africa) before it ever reaches a critical, completely uncontrollable mass in the way HIV did.

Perhaps the most optimism-inspiring difference between HIV/AIDS and Ebola is the two viruses’ rates of mutation. While both likely simmered in the forests of Central Africa long before scientists officially detected and classified them, Ebola’s genetic structure has hardly changed since the first confirmed cases in 1976 while HIV/AIDS has mutated incredibly rapidly, making treatment for HIV/AIDS much more difficult to square with virus’s continually changing configuration. Ebola’s steady genetic structure makes the prospects for a cure much more promising, and as we’ve seen with the initial success of ZMapp, cures seem to be on the horizon. Now we just have to hope treatments can be produced and distributed asap because, while Ebola is not likely to become a global epidemic, it is causing untold suffering in West Africa that we likely won’t realize the true extent of for some time yet. Ebola’s destructive path through West Africa includes not only the direct victims of the virus, but also those caught in the clashes between soldiers enforcing quarantines and those trying to flee its path, survivors who are now shunned by their communities, communities that no longer trust doctors and hospitals, businesses and entire economies that have taken a massive hit, and medical infrastructure throughout the region that has been depleted, abandoned, and looted, causing other illnesses to proliferate in the absence of treatment facilities. Still it is worth noting the statistics on HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases deaths per day dwarf Ebola deaths in the Ebola-affected countries–a reminder that those preventable diseases also require immediate attention and that serious long term work to repair medical infrastructure and communities’ relations with medical personnel will be imperative to West Africans’ health once this outbreak can be contained.

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[1] Daniel G Bausch, et al., “Assessment of the Risk of Ebola Virus Transmission from Bodily Fluids and Fomites,” Journal of Infectious Disease, 196(), S142-S147. Available online: http://jid.oxfordjournals.org/content/196/Supplement_2/S142.full

It’s been a while since I’ve had a chance to post, but seeing a sneak peak screening of Half of a Yellow Sun tonight has moved me to type up a few thoughts. First of all it was a terrific movie–maybe the best big budget film that I’ve seen set in Africa (and I don’t dislike movies like Blood Diamond and The Last King of Scotland). Warning: it starts slow. I hope critics sit through the whole thing and don’t write it off based on the first twenty minutes where we feel like the director and actors are getting their bearings. It was actually shot in Calabar and Town Creek, Nigeria by a Nigerian director (Biyi Bandele) and with a Nigerian production company, so I imagine a learning curve was a factor. Biyi Bandele started as a playwright and in the beginning the film feels more like a videotaped play that doesn’t quite match the periodicity of the historic footage of 1960s Nigeria that’s mixed in throughout the film to narrative the numerous political turns the country took during that rocky first decade. So, not having read the book, I started to worry that the movie was flopping about 30 minutes in when it was basically a historic soap opera that followed the lives of twins (Olanna and Kainene) in the first few years of independence as they moved from Lagos to Nsukka and Port Harcourt, fell in love and lost their trust in their lovers. Sex, jealousy, and lover’s rows summarize the first half of the film, shot in intimate frames that offer slivers into the lives of the characters. The second half of the movie pans out cinematographically and in content when war breaks out in a shocking scene at an airport. Despite the choppiness out of the gate, by this point we really know the characters through all their tribulations and more comedic moments (which there are plenty), and how many movies about Africa can we say that about before the violence breaks out?? Then the second half of the film left my heart in my throat. The war, the suffering, the constant anxiety of the second act hints that the first act’s over-the-top-soap-opera-style may have been self-conscious satire. The most memorable line in the movie comes as Olanna and Kainene are walking down a dirt road after they’ve each lost all security due to the atrocious war, and Kainene says, “There are some things that are so unforgivable that they make other things easily forgivable.” I’m kind of spelling it out here, but based on the early Rotten Tomatoes reviews (mostly from Australians where it’s already been released who have said things like “Much of the narrative plays out like a TV melodrama;” “Only when the protagonists’ lives are at stake – and bombs drop – does the piece truly come alive, with a sense of much-needed urgency;” “Bandele fails to establish the narrative’s wider national and political context, and the film is ultimately insubstantial as a result.”), I’m concerned that critics will miss the message of the movie along with why Bandele chose to partition it the way that he did. If this continues to be the critic’s take, don’t buy it; see Half a Yellow Sun for yourself and see past the production hiccups and the unfamiliar pacing to experience a stunning adaption about love, loss, and Africa. Oh yeah, I almost forgot to mention that the one white character is very much in the periphery even if his presence helps American audiences digest and relate to the movie. Refreshing.

Here’s the Trailer for those who haven’t see it yet.

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A few very relevant and interesting articles came out over break in the New York Times and on Phys.org:

1. Seth Kaplan suggested that Lagos might be a model city for the future. He describes the recent success the Lagos government has had in raising revenue, cleaning up the city, and reducing crime, and makes the case that other fragile states like Nigeria could learn from Lagos and adopt policies giving more autonomy to cities, which could then become hubs of good governance and service delivery. With megacities mushrooming in fragile states there are definite merits to this return-to-city-states idea. But it remains to be seen what will happen when cities like Lagos no longer feel a need for the central government and are perhaps even more powerful than it.

2. Kennedy Odede discussed the bleak odds he lived through growing up in Nairobi’s slums and warned that the kind of urban poverty he experienced creates a fertile breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. Odede is 29 years old; a year from surpassing the life expectancy of Kibera slum where he grew up. He describes the violence and terror common in this mega-slum and explains how survival requires desensitization to death. From there the financial incentives offered by terrorist groups in Somalia and elsewhere become alluring. Odede calls for investment in urban renewal in Africa to create hope for the future in places like Kibera, not simply a new frontier in the military pursuit of terrorists.

3. And, on a lighter note, Phys.org had an article on an innovative and resourceful way some Nigerians are creating their homes out of recycled soda bottles. The house looks sturdy and attractive. It seems almost like living in a piece of El Anatsui art.

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This article from The Africa Report rehashes the need for urban planning for Africa’s rapidly urbanizing population and then focuses on laying out the four ways that planning can be funded: “raising taxes; state transfers; cooperation agreements; and appeals for loans.” The article also promotes the UN’s panacea of decentralization for Africa’s ills, which gets thrown out there a lot as a buzzword without much thought (without distinguishing the more common decentralization of bureaucracy from the more important decentralization of actual power), but in this case connecting it to the example of Fashola’s autonomy from Abuja and his social contract of real services in exchange for taxes works well. The call for cooperation and communication between Africa’s 15,000 mayors is also an important point.

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Following up onmthe last post, here’s another article (from the August New Yorker) questioning whether Mayor Fashola is leaving behind the city’s poorer residents in his pursuit of glamorous projects like Eko Atlantic that provide clean water and reliable power for the ultra rich. The article points to the Makoko slum built over polluted water on boards and logs and asks why solutions like the floating school designed by Kunle Adeyimi isn’t being developed for the people struggling in Makoko. For a look into life in Makoko read this article on the slum’s high teenage birthrate. After years of predominately positive coverage of improvements in Lagos the media seems to definitely be going through a more negative phase…I imagine that much of Fashola’s legacy will be tied to Eko Atlantic for better or worse and making sure the project is completed is consuming the majority of his time currently. What EA will mean for the rest of Lagos is yet to be seen. I have a chance to ask Mayor Fashola a question during a group video conference next week and am thinking about what I should ask and will be sure to share his response here. The article did a nice job juxtaposing these two images of EA and Makoko:

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Is the slogan of the Lagosian Mayor Babatunde Fashola, but the author of this op-ed, Femi Aribisala, is beginning to wonder if by “dogs” Mayor Fashola doesn’t mean “poor people” in his vision of the future Lagos megacity. The article claims that poor people are being rounded up in the night and transported out of Lagos and that visas may soon become a requirement to enter into what Mr. Aribisala thinks has become a city for the rich man. While acknowledging the effective governance of Fashola, he questions who speaks for the urban poor–those who cannot afford a home in Lagos now and certainly will not be able to purchase a plot on Eko Atlantic (if they’re even allowed on the new island in the first place). He raises a needed inquiry into who is driving the narrative of Fashola being a savior of Lagos and wonders if the slum residents might disagree, instead preferring a governor such as Baba Kerere, who introduced housing and education programs targeted on the urban poor during his term in the early 80s. Fashola also has what he calls a “social contract” with the residents of Lagos–pay taxes and receive services–see this article by Howard French in which Fashola glows as an organizer and revitalizer of Lagos life, growing tax revenue from $4 million per month to over $101 million per month while still only receiving revenue from only 3 million of the 8 million working residents of the city. French’s portrait of a benevolent mayor investing in infrastructure that improves the everyday life of Lagos is challenged by Aribisala’s insights into the fact that one way Lagos collects revenue is through tolls on paved roads that then make those roads inaccessible to the destitute whose livelihood may have come from peddling or or driving a motorcycle taxi on those highways, evoking for me similarities to the history of how American highway systems severed black communities and physically cutoff urban blacks during the 50s and 60s. How Fashola reacts to these criticisms will be interesting to follow; the comparison that comes to my mind is of Kagame in Rwanda and the international and business praise that he initially garnered for his organization and development of Rwanda in the aftermath the genocide, and the subsequent muddling of that narrative resulting from reports and stories have been written from listening to the perspective of people living in Rwanda (Hutu or homeless Kigali residents) who do not view Kagame in such rosy terms (see this recent nytimes article based on an interview where the author confronted Kagame about some of the allegations against him). Kagame seems to be getting a little cagey in light of these criticisms and that leaves me feeling uneasy about Rwanda’s future. The initial narrative of Fashola could be seen in a similar light–he and his predecessor, Bola Tinubu, have brought Lagos out of a dark period that is not widely understood by western observers (like the genocide in Rwanda) and have transformed the city in ways that are appealing to western visitors, but of course now challenges to that version of history are appearing. At the end of French’s piece he recounts an episode where Fashola was confronted by the vigorous and healthy Nigerian press, in which he claims Fashola seemed to revel in their challenges and address them head on–hopefully Lagos’s government continues to directly address its critics.

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